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INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Circuit recently granted a preliminary injunction to
permit a transgender high school student to use the bathroom in
accordance with his gender identity, striking down the school district’s
unwritten sex-based bathroom policy.1 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit
has created the nation’s only firm sanctuary from bathroom
discrimination for transgender students.
The school district petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States.23 The amicus briefs in support of
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Whitaker by Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858
F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 28, 2017) (No. 17-301).
2
Id.
3
In the intervening time between writing and publishing this Comment, Ashton
graduated from high school and the Kenosha School District has settled the matter
with Ashton Whitaker for $800,000.00. See Fortin, Jacey, Transgender Student’s
Discrimination Suit is Settled for $800,000.00, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan 10, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/transgender-wisconsin-school-lawsuit.html.
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the school district’s petition appeal to speculative fear and
misrepresent the established law upon which the Seventh Circuit relied
in reaching its pro-transgender decision. Likewise, the Supreme Court
of the United States, the Department of Justice, and the Department of
Education have all expressed early indications of hostility to
transgender discrimination protections.4
Part I of this Comment lays a foundation of necessary contextual
information for understanding transgender rights. It also explains
various terms essential to analysis of transgender issues and discusses
problems transgender individuals face on a routine basis.5 Part II
presents the legal context in which transgender bathroom rights in
public schools arise, including relevant statutes and subsequent
judicial precedent. Part III delves into the Seventh Circuit’s grant of
injunction in favor of a transgender high school student in Whitaker
Ex. Rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha School District, barring the school
district from enforcing its unwritten sex-classification bathroom
policy.6 Part IV discusses the movement against transgender rights,
This specific case will not reach the Supreme Court of the United States, but the
issue of transgender bathroom policies in public schools will likely return before the
Court; one student living in the Seventh Circuit has already filed suit against his
Indiana high school. See Hussein, Fatima, Transgender High Schooler Sues
Evansville Schools for Bathroom Access, THE INDY STAR (Feb. 27, 2018)
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/02/27/transgender-high-schooler-suesevansville-schools-restroom-access/373393002/.
4
Casual observers of news and social media in 2017 are likely aware of the
rising tide against transgender individuals. That animus is codified in the actions of
the Attorney General and the White House. See STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY
GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214
(D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett, Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban
on Transgender Service Members, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-announces-ban-on-transgender-servicemembers-in-military-twitter/.
5
This Comment recognizes that gender and sexuality are fluid concepts that
occur on a spectrum, and human beings often do not fit neatly into one category. See
The Kinsey Scale, KINSEY INSTITUTE OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY,
https://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php (last
accessed Nov. 21, 2017).
6
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1034.
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specifically focusing on the amicus briefs submitted in favor of the
Kenosha School District’s writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Finally, this Comment concludes by arguing that the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of transgender issues is the only appropriate
analysis under existing law, urges the Supreme Court and other courts
to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and further argues that the
arguments levied in the amicus briefs are predominantly rooted in
animus, not sound legal analysis.
I.

WHAT IS A TRANSGENDER PERSON?

“Transgender” is “an umbrella term for person whose gender
identity or expression (masculine, feminine, other) is different from
their sex (male, female) at birth.”7 Understanding the distinction
between “sex” and “gender identity” is essential to understanding
transgendered people. “Sex” refers to the biological DNA makeup of a
human being that determines that human’s reproductive organs.8 Over
99% of humans are born with chromosomes and sex organs that are
either male or female.9 This binary is present in nearly all mammals.10
Essentially, sex is an objective measure of whether an individual has
reproductive organs with sperm that can fertilize eggs during the
reproductive process (male), or sex organs with eggs that can be
fertilized during the reproductive process (female).11
7

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 18, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/transgender.htm.
8
Gender and Genetics, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (last visited Nov. 14,
2017),
http://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/index1.html#Sex%20Chromosome%20Abn
ormalities.
9
How Commons Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (last
visited Sep. 30, 2017), http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency.
10
WERNER A MUELLER ET AL.,,. DEVELOPMENT AND REPRODUCTION IN
HUMANS AND ANIMAL MODEL SPECIES (2015).
11
Gender and Gender Identity PLANNED PARENTHOOD (2017),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/sexual-orientation-gender/gender-genderidentity
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Gender, by contrast, refers to societal and cultural expectations of
individuals based on his or her sex.12 This concept is succinctly
illustrated by the history of clothing for young children in the United
States. An 1884 photograph of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as
a toddler shows the young boy with: (1) long, curly locks of hair; (2) a
knee-length pink dress; (3) an ornate frilly hat with a ribbon on it; and
(4) Mary Jane shoes with calf-high socks.13 The social convention in
1884 expected young boys to wear dresses until age 6 or 7, which was
the time of their first haircut.14 This trend lasted for some time; in June
of 1918, an article from “Earnshaw’s Infants’ Department Store”
explained that “the generally accepted rule is pink for the boys, and
blue for the girls.”15 Over time, that trend switched. American culture
now widely accepts that pink clothing and accessories are appropriate
for female babies and blue for male babies. This assignment is so
engrained in the culture that a 2017 Buick Encore commercial features
a woman going to a baby shower with a pink cake and subsequently
rushing around town trying to get a blue cake because she learned lastminute that the baby was a male.16
This arbitrary switch in males’ baby clothing from pink to blue is
a perfect example of how society’s own stereotypes about sex
assignment are purely social in construction. Baby males and baby
females do not choose their clothing and nothing about the two colors
is innately tied to sex organs. Yet baby males are overwhelming
dressed in blue while baby females are overwhelmingly dressed in
pink. Thus, this color assignment exists purely because of external
societal pressures.
12

Krieger, Nancy, Genders, sexes, and health: What are the connections- and
why does it matter? INT. J. EPID. 34(4):652-7 (Aug. 2003).
13
Maglaty, Jeanne, When Did Girls Start Wearing Pink? SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE (April 4, 2011), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/whendid-girls-start-wearing-pink-1370097/?no-ist.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
About 2017 Buick Encore Preferred TV Commercial, 'Baby Shower' Song by
Matt and Kim ISPOT.TV (last visited Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wAxW/2017-buick-encore-oh-boy.
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When children grow up, these stereotypes based on sex evolve:
male children are often expected to wear short hair, play sports,
wrestle with other males, or play with toy vehicles and army figures.
By contrast, female children are expected to be dainty and gentle, wear
dresses, or play with dolls. Adult males are often expected to be rough,
strong, short-haired, independent, and aggressive; adult females are
often expected to be submissive, gentle, small, friendly, and pretty.
These expectations (or stereotypes) may aptly apply to many males
and females, but of course society is full of females who are rough,
strong, short-haired, independent and aggressive (and vice versa). The
discrepancy between societal expectations on the basis of sex and each
individual’s desire to embrace those expectations creates a vast, fluid
gender identity scale.
“Gender identity” refers to an individual’s own internal
understanding of one’s own gender.17 “Gender expression” is a term
“used to describe one’s outward presentation of their gender.”18 A
male adult who internally feels more aligned with society’s
expectations of female adults may take steps to transition from a man
to a woman by wearing clothing, makeup, jewelry, shoes, hair
products, undergarments, and fingernail accessories expected of
female adults.
A transgender person is a person whose sex is different from their
gender identity.19 Transgender people face a litany of daily struggles.
In addition to society’s direct mistreatment of transgender people for
being different, such as staring or harassing,20 transgender people are
forced to wrestle with the decision about where to use the bathroom in
public multiple times per day. Because buildings in the United States
17

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 18, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/transgender.htm.
18
Id.
19
What Does Transgender Mean? GLAAD (last visited Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq.
20
75% of transgender youth feel unsafe at school. See Issues: Youth &
Students NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Oct. 3, 2017),
http://www.transequality.org/issues/youth-students.
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are designed to have bathrooms segregated by sex, transgender
individuals are routinely forced into choosing which bathroom is
appropriate. A female who identifies as a man, who may have had
breast reduction surgery and years of hormone therapy causing a lower
voice and more body and facial hair, typically feels more comfortable
in the bathroom with other low-voiced, bearded people without
breasts. For transgender individuals, going to the bathroom in
accordance with gender identity is a vital aspect of transition.
In 2016, North Carolina passed a law banning cities from
allowing transgender individuals to use public bathrooms in
accordance with gender identity.21 Sixteen other states considered
legislation restricting bathroom access to transgender people.22 These
efforts to prevent transgender individuals from using bathrooms in
accordance with their gender identity is indicative of conservative
social pressures against transgender rights. A petition to boycott
Target retail stores gathered over 1.5 million signatures after the store
announced that it would permit transgender individuals to use the
bathroom of their gender identity.23 The petition argues that the rule
allows men to “simply say he ‘feels like a woman today’ and enter the
women’s restroom”; it goes on to assert that such a policy “is exactly
how sexual predators get access to their victims.”24 This animus
against transgender people attempting to use the bathroom of their
gender identity, or perhaps merely wanton disregard for the rights of
transgender people in lieu of defending from the specter of sexual
predators, has trickled down into public schools. One of those public
21

Kopan, Tal, Scott, Eugene, North Carolina Governor Signs Controversial
Transgender Bill,CNN [date], http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/northcarolina-gender-bathrooms-bill/index.html
22
Kralik, Joellen ’Bathroom Bill’ Legislative Tracking, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislativetracking635951130.aspx.
23
Sign the Boycott Target Pledge! AMERICAN FAMILY ASSOCIATION April 20,
2016), https://www.afa.net/activism/action-alerts/2016/04/sign-the-boycott-targetpledge/.
24
Id.

227

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/8

6

: The “Animus” Briefs: Attacks on the Seventh Circuit’s Sound Analy

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

schools is in the Kenosha Unified School District in Wisconsin, where
transgender student Ashton Whitaker was subjected to his school’s
unwritten rule that students must use the bathroom of their sex organs
and not their gender identity.25
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS

Ashton Whitaker brought suit against the school district under
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681,
et seq, (“Title IX”) and the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.26 While some states
have laws that may protect or restrict transgender rights, this Comment
limits discussion to Title IX and the Equal Protections Clause in the
context of transgender discrimination.
A. Title IX Generally
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 was
enacted only eight years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil
Rights Act spurred unprecedented workforce participation by women,
who subsequently faced a significant earnings gap compared to male
counterparts.27 The public began to realize that equal opportunity in
the workplace did little help to women who had unequal opportunity
in the education system.28 To remedy this problem, Congress passed
Title IX, which prohibited sex discrimination in any school receiving
federal money.29
Title IX provides, in part, that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
25

Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.,
858 F.3d 1034, [page number] (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 28,
2017) (No. 17-301).
26
Id. at 1042.
27
Title IX Legislative History DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (last visited Nov. 21,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#II.
28
Id.
29
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a).
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the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”30 Public
schools, therefore, are prohibited from subjecting any person to
separate or different rules, sanctions, or treatment on the basis of sex.31
Title IX has been used, among other things, to prevent discrimination
against pregnant women,32 inequitable funding of women’s athletic
programs,33 and improper policies regarding sexual harassment in
schools.34
Because both Title VII and Title IX prohibit sex discrimination
in various realms of the public, the Seventh Circuit has turned to Title
VII jurisprudence in deciding Title IX cases and vice versa.35 The
Seventh Circuit first dealt with gender identity discrimination in the
context of a Title VII employment case in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.36 That 1984 decision held that transsexuals37 were not protected
under Title VII.38 In so deciding, the court noted that both the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits had already held that discrimination against
transsexuals was not prohibited under Title VII.39 The Ulane court
further reasoned that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the
30

20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a).
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2)-(4).
32
See, e.g., North Haven Board of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (holding
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy amounted to sex discrimination).
33
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005)
(holding that a coach could bring suit on behalf of his girls’ basketball team inferior
funding).
34
See, e.g., Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School Dist., 511
F.3d 1114 ( 10th Cir. 2008).
35
Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Tp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir.
1997).
36
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
37
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. The word “transsexuals” refers to transgender
individuals who have already undergone sex reassignment surgery.
38
Id. at 1087.
39
Id. at 1086, citing Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982) and Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-62 (9th
Cir. 1977).
31
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basis of being a transsexual, not on the basis of being a female or
being a male.40 The court pointed to the lack of Congressional intent
regarding transsexuals and determined that the plain language of the
term “sex” did not allow for an interpretation that included
discrimination on the basis of being a transsexual.41
The Supreme Court brought sea change to Title VII sex
discrimination analysis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.42 In Price
Waterhouse, a female former employee of an accounting firm sued the
firm for sex discrimination, arguing that she was denied promotion
because she did not fit the stereotypical expectations of a female.43 Her
supervisors complained of her conduct being “macho,” expressed
distaste with her profanity “only because it was a lady using foul
language,” and advised that she should “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.”44 The Court declared: “we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group.”45 This decision was the first to firmly establish that gender
stereotyping is an actionable form of sex discrimination.46
The Seventh Circuit applied the reasoning from Price
Waterhouse to conclude that employers could not discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of
Indiana.47 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned that an
employer discriminating against a woman for being in a relationship
40

Id. at 1087.
Id.
42
490 U.S. 228 (1989) superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1991), as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
251 (1994).
43
Id. at 235.
44
Id. at 235.
45
Id. at 231.
46
Id. at 258.
47
853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Hively involved a professor at a
college who was passed over for promotion on five occasions and alleged she was
being discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation as a lesbian.
41
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with a woman is engaging in sex discrimination because that employer
would not discriminate against a man for being in a relationship with a
woman.48 The court also compared sexual orientation discrimination
to anti-miscegenation statutes prohibiting marriage between white
people and black people that were held unconstitutional in Loving v.
Virginia.49 In comparing the two cases, the Hively court noted that the
Loving Court outright rejected the argument that the antimiscegenation statutes “punish equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage.”50 Likewise, the Hively court
rejected the argument that sexual orientation discrimination punished
men and women equally for homosexuality.51 The Hively decision
overruled a series of Seventh Circuit cases that held that sexual
orientation discrimination was not prohibited under Title VII.52
The Seventh Circuit is the only federal appellate court to apply
the Price Waterhouse Title VII gender stereotyping framework to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while some lower
district courts have embraced the analysis.53 Less than a month before
the Seventh Circuit decided Hively, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its
decades of precedent that sexual orientation discrimination was not
prohibited under Title VII.54 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits also held that Title VII does not include sexual orientation
48

Id.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
50
Hively, 653 F.3d at 347 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 8).
51
Id. at 348.
52
See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Hamm v.
Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2002); Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford
Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
53
Sprain, Pueschel, & Heyen, Seventh Circuit Court Rules Sexual Orientation
is Protected Class: Kimberliy Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, THE
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (April 6, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/seventh-circuit-court-rules-sexual-orientationprotected-class-kimberly-hively-v-ivy.
54
Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
49
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discrimination.5556 In the context of transgender discrimination,
however, the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
recognized that the Price Waterhouse reasoning applies.57

55

Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (11th Cir.
2017) (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st
Cir. 1999) (“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual
orientation.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Simonton has
alleged that he was discriminated against not because he was a man, but because of
his sexual orientation. Such a claim remains non-cognizable under Title VII.”);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.”); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)
(“Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual
orientation....”); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title
VII.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th
Cir. 2000) (“[H]arassment based solely upon a person's sexual preference or
orientation (and not on one's sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)
(“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”); Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002) (A]n employee's sexual
orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII); Medina v. Income Support Div.,
413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII's protections, however, do not
extend to harassment due to a person's sexuality).
56
The D.C. Circuit has not ruled on the issue.
57
See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that terminating an employee because she is transgender violates the prohibition on
sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause following the reasoning
of Price Waterhouse); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 573–75 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that transgender employee had stated a claim under Title VII based
on the reasoning of Price Waterhouse); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d
213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a transgender individual could state a
claim for sex discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act based on Price
Waterhouse); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–03 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a transgender individual could state a claim under the Gender
Motivated Violence Act under the reasoning of Price Waterhouse).
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B. Equal Protection Clause Generally
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”58 This provision protects against “intentional and
arbitrary” discrimination.59 When a statute draws classifications
between groups of people or sects, it is generally presumed to be
lawful if the discriminatory practice is “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”60 This rational basis test does not apply when
the statute’s classification is based on sex,61 however, as sex-based
classifications are subject to “heightened scrutiny.” 62 Courts reason
that classifications on the basis of sex require heightened scrutiny
because sex “frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or
contribute to society.”63
In order to justify a classification on the basis of sex, the
government must demonstrate that its justification for the
classification is “exceedingly persuasive.”64 Therefore, this heightened
standard requires the government to prove that its classification
“serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”65 The difference between these two standards is
significant. Determining whether to apply a rational basis test or
heightened scrutiny to transgender discrimination cases essentially
amounts to determining the winner of the case because the rational
basis test is an extremely low bar for government actors to satisfy.66
58

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, (1982)).
59
Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
60
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
65
Id. at 524.
66
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
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This burden for the government is so minimal that the Supreme Court
has called rational basis “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”67 By contrast,
classifications analyzed under heightened scrutiny present a
significantly bigger hurdle.
C.

Title VII and Equal Protections Applied to Transgender
Bathroom Rights

In 2016, the Fourth Circuit addressed transgender public
school bathroom rights in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County
School Bd.68 In Grimm, a transgender high school student challenged
his school’s biological sex-based bathroom policy under the Equal
Protections Clause and Title IX, arguing that the policy discriminated
against him on the basis of sex and seeking injunctive relief to be
allowed to use the bathroom in accordance with his gender identity.69
The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the student’s claims
on procedural grounds and remanded the case to the district court to
reconsider the injunction.70 In his concurrence, Senior Circuit Judge
Andre Davis argued that the Fourth Circuit “would be on sound
ground in granting the requested preliminary injunction on the
undisputed facts in the record.”71 That concurrence laid out the
elements of a preliminary injunction and determined that the
transgender student was likely to succeed on the merits of his Title IX
claim.72 Neither the majority nor the concurrence addressed the equal
protection claim, focusing instead on the Title IX claim in light of the
Obama-appointed Department of Education’s recommended

67

Id.
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369, (2016), and
vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
69
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 710.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 727 (Davis, J. concurring).
72
Id. (Davis, J. concurring).
68
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interpretation of “sex.”73 On remand, the district court granted the
preliminary injunction and simply stated: “Judge Davis explained
why.”74 The Fourth Circuit denied the school district’s motion to stay
the injunction pending appeal.75
The school district applied to recall and stay the preliminary
injunction in the Supreme Court of the United States.76 Then, on
August 3, 2016, a few weeks before the student, who identified as a
boy, began his senior year of high school, the Supreme Court granted
the application and stayed the preliminary injunction, forcing the boy
to use the girls’ restroom.77 Justice Stephen Breyer penned a
concurrence explaining his decision to force a transgender boy to use
the girls’ bathroom until the Supreme Court got around to hearing the
case, stating, “I vote to grant the application as a courtesy.”78 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on October 28, 2016.79
Before the Court could hear the case, however, the Justice
Department and the Department of Education withdrew guidance to
schools that interpreted Title IX to include transgender discrimination
within the realm of sex discrimination.80 This revocation of regulatory
guidance prompted the Court to vacate its grant of certiorari and
remand the case to be considered in light of the new guidance.81 The
student has since graduated from the high school, and his case has
been remanded to the district court to determine whether his claim is
moot.82

73

Id. at 710 (majority opinion).
G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15CV54, 2016 WL 3581852, at *1
(E.D. Va. June 23, 2016), vacated, 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Apr.
18, 2017).
75
G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 654 F. App'x 606 (4th Cir. 2016).
76
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016).
77
Gloucester, 136 S. Ct. at 2442.
78
Id. (Breyer, J. Concurring).
79
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.Ct. 369 (Mem)
80
STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF T ITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633.
81
Gloucester, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (Mem).
82
Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017).
74
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Accordingly, without guidance from regulatory bodies and without
the Fourth Circuit’s determination, the issue was completely
undecided before the Seventh Circuit heard Ash Whitaker’s case.
III.

ASH WHITAKER V. KENOSHA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. Factual Background

Ashton Whitaker (“Ash”) is a high school student in the
Kenosha Unified School District who was ultimately granted a
preliminary injunction allowing him to use the bathroom of his gender
identity.83 Ash was born female, but he identifies as man.84 During his
freshman and sophomore years of high school, Ash changed his name
legally and began to wear masculine clothing, cut his hair, use male
pronouns, and request that teachers use male pronouns when referring
to him.85 His therapist diagnosed him with Gender Dysphoria, which
is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a medical
classification of sex and gender identity conflict.86 The school notified
Ash that despite his identity as a man, he was only permitted to use the
girls’ restroom or a gender-neutral restroom far from his classrooms.87
Ash feared that if he used the gender neutral bathroom and arrived late
to the majority of his classes, he would draw more attention to his
transition.88 Ash also noted that he felt using the girls’ bathroom
undermined his gender identity.89 As a result, Ash resolved to avoid
using the bathroom altogether and significantly reduced his water
intake so that he could go all day without using the bathroom.90
This restriction on his water intake caused medical problems
such as fainting and seizures because Ash was diagnosed with
83

Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1040-43.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
84
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vasovagal syncope.91 Moreover, Ash suffered from stress-related
migraines, depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts as a result of the
bathroom policy.92 Ash provided the school with a letter from his
doctor recommending that Ash be allowed to use the boys’ restroom,
but the school did not waver from its position.93 Ash also submitted a
letter from his counsel demanding that the school permit him to use
the boys’ restroom, but the school responded by repeating its policy.94
When these attempts to resolve the situation failed, Ash filed
suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the school district
under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 On the same day of filing,
Ash moved for a preliminary injunction to allow him to use the boys’
restroom, pending the outcome of the litigation.96 The school district
filed a motion to dismiss and a motion in opposition to the preliminary
injunction.97
The district court denied the school district’s motion to
dismiss, finding that Ash alleged facts sufficient to support a claim of
gender stereotyping under Price Waterhouse and that the school
articulated “little in the way of a rational basis for the alleged
discrimination” under Equal Protection Clause analysis. 98 Relying on
91

Id. Vasovagal syncope is a malfunction in the nervous system that causes
dilated blood vessels in the legs and slowed heart rate, causing reduced blood flow to
the brain and subsequent fainting. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Vasovagal syncope,
MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/vasovagal-syncope/symptoms-causes/syc20350527https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/vasovagalsyncope/symptoms-causes/syc-20350527.
92
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1042-43.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., No. 16-CV-943PP, 2016 WL 5239829, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Whitaker By
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir.
2017).
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that same reasoning, the district court granted Ash’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the school district from: (1) denying
him to use the boys’ restroom; (2) enforcing any policy against him
that would prevent him from using the boys’ restroom; (3) disciplining
him for using the boys’ restroom; and (4) monitoring his bathroom use
in any way.99 The school district appealed the injunction to the
Seventh Circuit.100
B. Seventh Circuit Analysis
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the district court’s injunction
grant by beginning with the basic requirements of a preliminary
injunction.101 A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1)
that he will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief
during the pendency of his action; (2) inadequate remedies at law
exist; and (3) he has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits
of his claims.102 If all three can be demonstrated, the court balances the
potential harm to the moving party against potential harm to other
parties or the public.103
The court in Whitaker determined that the evidence of Ash’s
medical conditions, coupled with the bathroom policy’s exacerbation
of those medical conditions, was a sufficient showing of likelihood of
irreparable harm.104 The court further pointed out that the school
district’s decision to force Ash into far-away bathrooms that caused
him to be late for class would “further stigmatize him and cause him to
miss class time, or avoid the use of the bathroom altogether at the
expense of his health.”105 The court then rejected the school district’s
argument that any harm Ash may suffer could be remedied with

99

Id.
Id.
101
Whitaker, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017).
102
Id. at 1044.
103
Id.
104
Id. 1045.
105
Id.
100
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monetary damages.106 Ash had alleged prospective self-harm,
including suicide, which would preclude any remedy at law.107 After
establishing that Ash satisfied the first two elements required of a
preliminary injunction, the court turned to the merits of Ash’s claim
and balanced prospective harm to the parties and the public in granting
the preliminary injunction.108
i.

Title IX analysis

The Whitaker court began its analysis by noting that courts in
the Seventh Circuit look to Title VII in construing Title IX.109 The
school district argued that the court should rely on Ulane, where the
Seventh Circuit held that transsexuals are not protected under Title
VII.110 The court conceded that some other courts agreed with the
school district’s argument, only to emphatically reject that argument,
simply stating: “We disagree.”111 The court dismantled the school
district’s Ulane argument citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse, which came five years after the Ulane decision: “this
court and others have recognized a cause of action under Title VII
when an adverse action is taken because of an employee’s failure to
conform to sex stereotypes.”112 Moreover, the court reiterated that the
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that homosexuals discriminated
against on the basis of their sexual orientation can state a Title VII
claim on the basis of sex stereotyping.113
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1047 (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014,
1023 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “it is helpful to look to Title VII to determine
whether the alleged sexual harassment is severe and pervasive enough to constitute
illegal discrimination on the basis of sex for purposes of Title IX.”)).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
107
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The school district argued that Ash could not show a likelihood
of success because its unwritten policy “is not based on whether the
student behaves, walks, talks, or dresses in a manner that is
inconsistent with any preconceived notions of sex stereotypes.”114 In
rebuttal, the court explained that transgender individuals do not
conform to the sex-based stereotypes of their birth sex, adding that the
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have also recognized the transgender sexstereotyping cause of action under Title VII.115 The court held that Ash
could demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his Title IX
claim because he alleged that the school district denied him access to
the boys’ bathroom based on stereotypes expected of his birth sex.116
ii.

Equal Protection Claim

Once the court determined a likelihood of success on the merits
of the Title IX claim, it was unnecessary to even address the Equal
Protection claim because the injunction would be permissibly granted
under any likely successful theory of recovery.117 However, the court
addressed the Equal Protection claim nonetheless.118 In this endeavor,
the court deviated from the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Grimm,
where the injunction analysis was limited to a Title IX claim under the
Department of Justice’s interpretation of the word “sex.”119
In analyzing the Equal Protection claim, the Whitaker court
refused to apply a rational basis test, reasoning that transgender
individuals are a suspect class in light of the historical discrimination
against them based on immutable characteristics of their gender
identities.120 The court noted that because the bathroom policy could
114

Id.
Id. at 1048 (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); and
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)).
116
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 710.
120
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052.
115
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not even be articulated without mentioning sex, it was inherently
based on a sex-classification triggering heightened scrutiny.121
Under a heightened scrutiny standard, the school district had
the burden of showing that its justification for its bathroom policy was
both genuine and exceedingly persuasive.122 However, the school
district had difficulty articulating why its bathroom policy justification
was genuine and exceedingly persuasive. The court’s opinion borders
on harsh in its continued outright rejection of each proffered reason.123
First, the court discussed the procedural requirements of the bathroom
policy, which the court reiterated was an unwritten policy.124 The
school district alleged that the unwritten policy required students to
use the restroom of their birth certificate, but the court pointed out that
Wisconsin birth certificates require sex-assignment surgery (a
procedure only available to adults) to alter sex classification,
ultimately precluding Ash from taking advantage of such an option.125
Moreover, the court argued that a Minnesota student could
have a birth certificate changed without any surgery, and that if a
Minnesota student moved to the Kenosha school district with the
appropriate birth certificate and not the appropriate genital organs for
the bathroom policy, the entire policy would be undermined.126 This
disconnect between policy and practice illustrated to the court that the
policy was more arbitrary than it was reasonable.127 Finally, the court
noted that the school district does not even require birth certificates for
enrolment, and will accept a passport as identification.128 Because the
State Department only requires a doctor’s note to alter sex
classification, the court found that the school district’s requirements
based on the birth certificate instead of the passport even further
121

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1052.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1051.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
122
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demonstrated that the policy was more likely driven by arbitrary
animus rather than genuine and exceedingly persuasive justification.129
Another point the court offered involved no actual analysis of
the specific facts of Whitaker, but instead focused on the practical use
of bathrooms in general.130 The court posited that a transgender
student’s presence in the restroom “provides no more of a risk to other
students’ privacy rights than the presence of an overly curious student
of the same biological sex who decides to sneak glances at his
classmates.”131 The school district’s only reasoning for its argument
that transgender students invade the privacy of other students was that
the transgender students possess physically different genitals than the
other students in the bathroom of their choosing.132 The court
countered that the school makes no effort to provide separate
restrooms for pre-pubescent boys and girls from those who have gone
through puberty even though they have significantly different sex
organs.133 This point draws on the commonsense notion that most
Americans never see anyone’s genitals in the bathroom. Without any
commonsense, reasonable, or persuasive justifications for the
regulation of bathroom use, the school district failed to demonstrate
why its sex classification was permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause.
iii.

Balance of harms favor Ash

Having established the elements of a preliminary injunction,
the court moved on to discussing the balance of harms between the
public good and Ash Whitaker’s likely prospective harm.134 Once a
moving party has met its burden of establishing the threshold
requirements for a preliminary injunction, the court must balance the
129

Id. at 1053.
Id.
131
Id. at 1052.
132
Id. at 1053.
133
Id.
134
Id.
130
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harms faced by both parties and the public.135 The court brought
powerful and pragmatic reasoning to the table in finding that Ash was
substantially more likely to suffer harm than the public.
The school district argued that the injunction’s harm would
extend to a violation of the “privacy” of its 22,160 students in the
district.136 It argued that allowing a transgender student to use a
bathroom that did not conform with birth sex would disrupt the
privacy of other students using the same bathroom.137 The school
district also levied the argument that the injunction harms the public as
a whole because it would force other school districts to also risk being
in violation of Title IX, thereby placing federal funding at risk.138
The Seventh Circuit emphatically disagreed. First, the court
noted that Ash used the boys’ bathroom for six months without any
incident, and that it was only when a teacher, not a student, reported
Ash to school administrators that the school took notice.139 In fact, the
school district made no showing of any student complaint about Ash at
any point before or during litigation, which effectively removed any
possibility of arguing that Ash’s presence in the boys’ room bothered
any students whatsoever.140 In response to the school district’s
argument that the preliminary injunction infringed upon the parents’
ability to direct the education of their children, the court simply stated
that the school district offered “no evidence that a parent has ever
asserted this right. These claims are all speculative.”141
Next, the court referenced the amici briefs of school administrators
from twenty-one states, who together were responsible for educating

135

Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of Am., Inc.,
549 F.3d 1079, 1100 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d
656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).
136
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1054.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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approximately 1.4 million students.142 The amici statements
emphatically and uniformly agreed that “the frequently-raised and
hypothetical concerns about a policy that permits a student to utilize a
bathroom consistent with his or her gender have simply not
materialized.”143 This finding poked a major hole in the Kenosha
School District’s argument that allowing Ash Whitaker to use the
boys’ bathroom would harm the public.
These minor grievances based on hypothetical concerns that
never tangibly materialized were scant justification for refusing to
grant the injunction in the face of the overwhelming evidence that
using the incorrect bathroom harmed Ash on a medical, emotional,
social, and physical level. Accordingly, the court granted the
preliminary injunction and signaled to school districts across the
Seventh Circuit that transgender bathroom policies would not fare well
in federal courts within the Seventh Circuit. The school district then
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States on August 27, 2017.144
IV.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REASONING UNDER ATTACK

The Seventh Circuit has laid out a perfect roadmap for any
court addressing transgender bathroom rights in public schools.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s stay of injunction in the Fourth
Circuit case Grimm v. Gloucester County is a concerning forecast of
possible infringements on transgender rights. These threats to
transgender rights go beyond the judiciary.145 The Trump
administration mounts pressure against schools as the Department of
142

Id.
Id. at 1055.
144
Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.,
858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 28, 2017) (No. 17-301).
145
STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF T ITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett,
Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service Members, CBS
NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-announces-ban-ontransgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/.
143
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Education and Department of Justice retreat from the pro-transgender
rights position of the Obama administration.146
On February 22, 2017, the Department of Justice and the
Department of Education revoked the Obama-era Title IX guidance on
transgender student bathroom use that interpreted “sex discrimination”
to include transgender discrimination.147 On July 26, 2017, the sitting
President of the United States announced that transgender individuals
would no longer be permitted in the military, a major departure from
the status quo under the Obama administration.148 On October 5, 2017,
the Attorney General Jeffrey Beauregard Sessions announced that the
Department of Justice would reverse its guidance on Title VII, stating
that Title VII also does not apply to gender identity discrimination.149
As the executive branch shows its hand as hostile towards
transgender rights, the Supreme Court has not made any rulings on the
issue since its stay of injunction in Gloucester County.150 Despite these
forces opposing transgender rights, the Seventh Circuit is a guiding
light for courts deciding this issue. The arguments levied against the
Seventh Circuit in amicus briefs submitted in favor of the school
district’s petition for a writ of certiorari, however, pose an acute threat
to transgender students across the country if heeded by the Supreme
Court of the United States.

146

STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF T ITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett,
Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service Members, CBS
NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-announces-ban-ontransgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/.
147
STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF T ITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633.
148
Tillett, Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service
Members, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumpannounces-ban-on-transgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/.
149
Moreau, Julie, Federal Civil Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Transgender
Workers, Justice Department Says, NBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017)
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/federal-civil-rights-law-doesn-t-protecttransgender-workers-justice-n808126
150
Gloucester County, 137 S. Ct. at 369.
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A. The “Animus Briefs”
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Kenosha school
district noted the Grimm decision and enticed the Court with an
opportunity to address the case again:
This issue is not new to this Court. In
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel.
Grimm this Court granted review to
address, in part, the Department of
Education’s interpretation of Title IX
that funding recipients providing sexseparated facilities must generally treat
transgender students consistent with
their gender identity. When the
Department of Education’s guidance
was later withdrawn, this Court was
deprived of an opportunity to address
these issues and the case was remanded
to the Fourth Circuit. This case provides
the Court with a clean vehicle to decide
the same underlying important issues
without the additional, complicating
layers
related
to
addressing
administrative review and deference.151
In the intervening month, nine amici curiae briefs were filed
by parties in opposition to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.152 The
151

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. ii.
See generally Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker (No. 17-301); Brief for
the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha. v. Whitaker, (No. 17-301); Brief for the
Foundation for Moral Law et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha
v. Whitaker, (No. 17-301); Brief for the Concerned Women For America, et al. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition
152
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organizations filing the briefs were notable conservative interest
groups, including The Family Research Council,153 The Eagle Forum
Education & Legal Defense Fund,154 Michigan Association of
Christian Schools,155 The Foundation for Moral Law,156157 and
Concerned Women for America.158 Many of these briefs displayed
profound insensitivity or misunderstanding about transgender rights
issues. One amicus brief, submitted by Citizens United159 and more
aptly called an “animus brief,” referred to Ash Whitaker as “she”160
and began its argument by stating that “Plaintiff Ash Whitaker is a girl
who currently self-identifies as a boy.”161 The Citizens United brief is
a picture-perfect example of animus towards transgender individuals.
The Citizens United brief justified its use of “she” in reference
to Ash by stating, “[t]o do otherwise sacrifices the plain meaning of
for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017); Brief for Citizens United, et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed
Aug. 25, 2017); Brief for William J. Bennett as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017).
153
Brief for Family Research Council, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017).
154
Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152.
155
Brief for the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools, supra at n.
152.
156
Brief for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.
157
The Foundation for Moral Law was founded by former Alabama state judge
Roy S. Moore, who was twice removed from the Alabama Supreme Court for
violating the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Judge Moore has been in the
national spotlight for soliciting sex from underage girls. See Ruhle, Stephanie,
Breaking Down the Nine Allegations Against Roy Moore, MSNBC, (Nov. 16, 2017)
http://www.msnbc.com/velshi-ruhle/watch/breaking-down-the-9-allegations-againstroy-moore-1097428547965.
158
Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152.
159
Citizens United is a conservative nonprofit organization. See generally,
About, CITIZENS UNITED (last visited Nov. 21, 2017)
http://www.citizensunited.org/index.aspx.
160
Citizens United is not alone in calling Ash “she” despite his gender identity.
The Foundation for Moral Law submitted a brief calling Ash “she” throughout. See
Brief for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.
161
Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.
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the English language on the altar of political correctness.”162 After
establishing that it would refuse to call Ash “he,” the Citizens United
brief went on to compare the plaintiff in Gloucester County to Ash
Whitaker, cynically calling their suits against their schools “test
cases.”163 More concerning, it stated: “it should not come as a surprise
that a female plaintiff was selected in each case. A boy in his senior
year of high school who would seek to spend time in the girls’
restroom would have presented the circuit court with a very different
set of facts and concerns.”164 It did not explain what “different set of
facts and concerns” would be at issue if Ash were born male and had a
doctor’s diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and instead left the grim
implications to the reader’s imagination.165
Another alarming argument Citizens United offered in its
“animus brief” was that the Seventh Circuit “failed to consider the
harm being done to Ash Whitaker by her mother, her counselors, and
her physicians” by treating her with hormone therapy.166 It did not
explain how the medical treatment Ash received was relevant to the
restroom litigation.167 The brief went on for pages with subversive,
malicious comments, including: “transgender persons are not suicidal
because they are discriminated against, but because they suffer from a
mental illness;”168 “in countless transgender cases across the country,
the ‘suicide card’ is being played;”169 and “what is to stop the varsity
boys’ lacrosse team from deciding en masse that they are all girls, and
barging into the girls’ locker room while the cheerleading squad is
changing clothes?”170

162

Id. at 4.
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 9.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 18.
169
Id. at 15.
170
Id. at 11.
163
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These stances frame the primary arguments brought against the
Seventh Circuit in the “animus” briefs, which are essentially as
follows: (1) the “plain meaning” or “plain text” of Title IX does not
apply to transgender bathroom rights, which is illustrated in Citizens
United’s refusal to even call Ash “he” in the name of “political
correctness”; (2) gender dysphoria is a mental illness and should be
treated as a disability by law, which is illustrated in Citizens United’s
argument that Ash’s mother and doctors are doing him harm in
treating him with hormone therapy; and (3) permitting transgender
individuals to use the restroom of their gender identity will enable
sexual predators to victimize women more often, which is illustrated
in Citizens United’s cryptic warning that Ash’s case would contain a
“different set of facts and concerns” if Ash were born male and
transitioned to a woman.
i.

The “plain meaning” argument

One common argument in the amici briefs was that the plain
language of Title IX refers to discrimination on the basis of biological
sex and not on the basis of gender identity.171 This argument is an
attack on the way the Seventh Circuit applied Price Waterhouse Title
VII sex-stereotyping framework to Title IX transgender bathroom
rights. William J. Bennett, who the New York Times once named the
“leading spokesman of the Traditional Values wing of the Republican
Party,”172 argued in an amici brief he submitted in support of the
school district that proscribing “on the basis of sex” is a question of
statutory interpretation.173 In support of this argument, Bennett went
through the standard cannons of construction, spanning fourteen
pages, from dictionary definitions to legislative history, ultimately
arriving at the conclusion that Congress intended the word “sex” to
171

Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United,
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools supra
at n. 152; Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund supra at n. 152.
172
Bennett, William, About Bill Bennett, BILL BENNETT SHOW (Feb. 2017)
https://billbennettshow.com/bio/.
173
Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152.
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refer to biological and physiological sex.174 After firmly establishing
that Congress intended to refer to biological and physiological sex
instead of gender identity, Bennett never stated how or why this fact
related to the matter of Ash Whitaker, foregoing any application of his
conclusion.175.
The Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund176 also
argued that the “plain meaning” of Title IX refers to biological sex.177
The Eagle Forum argued that in light of the fact that Title IX was
intended to refer to biological sex and not gender identity, the
“Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Price Waterhouse and its progeny is
also misplaced.”178 It went on to state that regulating “how boys and
girls dress (e.g. clothing, jewelry, hair length) differs fundamentally
from segregating restrooms by sex.”179 Its analysis was limited to the
facts of Price Waterhouse itself,180 arguing that the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse who employers thought too masculine for a woman “still
used the women’s restroom.”181
ii.

The “transgender people are mentally ill” argument

Like the Citizens United “animus” brief, the Eagle Forum brief
also argued that Ash Whitaker has a “disability.”182 Applying this
174

Id. at 5-19.
Id. at 19.
176
The Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund is a conservative
interest group and states on its website, “we oppose liberal propaganda in the
curriculum through global education and Political Correctness.” See Description,
EAGLE FORUM (last visited Nov. 21, 2017) http://eagleforum.org/misc/descript.html.
177
Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152.
178
Id. at 14.
179
Id.
180
Eagle Forum curiously refers to the famous Price Waterhouse case as
“Hopkins,” even though most federal judges would recognize the well-known case
as “Price Waterhouse.” One can only speculate as to why Eagle Forum would seek
to distance its discussion from the well-known Price Waterhouse body of law.
181
Id.
182
Id.
175
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logic, it asserted that Ash should have to exhaust the remedies of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before filing suit.183 The
Eagle Fund brief did not go as far as the Citizens United brief’s
outright claim that all transgendered people are mentally ill,184 but
instead posited, “whether or not [sic] transgenderism per se remains a
disorder under current medical views, Whitaker’s condition – with
migraines, depression, anxiety, and suicide ideation—nonetheless
potentially could qualify [as a disability].”185 It did not analyze the
definition of “disability” under the IDEA, nor how a transgender
person may or may not fit that definition, despite the fact that the other
federal legislation for disabled individuals, the ADAA, explicitly
excludes transgender people.186
Applying this reasoning to the Equal Protection claim, the
Eagle Forum argued that Ash was discriminated against on the basis of
“disability,” which is not a suspect class under Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence.187 The Eagle Forum rejected the notion that Ash
was discriminated against on the basis of sex and rejected the use of
heightened scrutiny in analyzing the classification-based regulation of
bathrooms.188 Under rational basis review nearly any regulation is
permissible so long as it is merely rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.189 The privacy of other students is a legitimate
governmental interest, so a policy that is simply rationally related to

183

Id.
Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152 (“it appears to be the modus
operandi of the transgender movement across the country – to claim suicidal
feelings, brought on by various defendants”).
185
Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152.
186
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101- 12213 (“ADA”)
expressly excludes “transsexualism” from the definition of “disability” under ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. §12211(b)(1).
187
Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at 16; see
also Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-67 (2001) (holding that disability is
not a suspect class and should be analyzed under rational basis review).
188
Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152.
189
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992).
184
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such a goal would pass the rational basis test.190 A policy that demands
sex-segregated bathrooms would almost certainly meet that criteria in
most courts and would be permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause.
iii.

The scare-tactics argument

The most prevalent argument proffered in the “animus” briefs
played to speculative fear of transgender people generally as well as
policies involving transgender bathroom use.191 The Foundation for
Moral Law brief’s entire first argument was that if schools implement
such bathroom policies, “the number of students claiming such rights
is likely to increase.”192 It cited several studies pointing to the gradual
increase of openly transgender people, arguing that “[i]n earlier times,
youths who felt such [transgender] impulses were possibly more likely
to keep quiet about them.”193 It concluded, “[t]hus, the Seventh
Circuit’s decision, if not reversed, could have the effect of
encouraging students to question gender identity and to take steps to
act on those thoughts.”194 It did not explain why encouraging students
to ponder gender identity is inherently negative, but instead relied on
the assumption that any reader would be able to infer that transgender
people are somehow inferior.195
In addition to the fear of transgenderism in general, these
“animus” briefs make outlandish arguments that permitting
transgender individuals to use the bathroom of their gender identity
will enable sexual predators to more easily victimize women in
190

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, U.S. 602, 626 (1989) (holding that
protecting privacy is a legitimate government interest).
191
Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United,
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152; Brief
for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.
192
Id. at 3.
193
Id. at 4.
194
Id. at 5-6.
195
Id.
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bathrooms, locker rooms, showers, and dressing rooms.196 This
argument echoes that of the aforementioned petition to boycott Target
retail stores when it implemented a pro-transgender bathroom policy
nationwide. Even though Ash Whitaker’s case was explicitly about
using the bathroom and the parties stipulated that Ash does not use the
school’s locker rooms, showers, or dressing rooms, these briefs
overwhelmingly analyzed the speculative danger of transgender
bathroom policies specifically in the context of locker rooms and
dressing rooms.
The Concerned Women for America197 animus brief
unironically invoked its own gender identity by arguing that the
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in favor of Ash’s gender identity is a safety
concern: “[a]s the nation’s largest public policy women’s organization,
your Amicus is vitally concerned that Title IX’s privacy and safety
protections for female (and male) students not be stripped away.”198
Without ever explaining why a pro-transgender bathroom policy
would affect bathroom safety, the Concern Women’s brief asserted
that two of its leaders have been sexually assaulted (one of whom was
videotaped in a women’s bathroom when she was a teenager, decades
before any sort of transgender bathroom law)199 and proceeded to list
three separate instances in which Target stores had problems of
“peeping toms” after it implemented its transgender bathroom
policy.200 It did not state whether these three instances were more than
the usual amount of instances. Aside from this handful of anecdotes,
the brief did not provide any statistical data to prove that transgender

196

Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United,
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152; Brief
for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.
197
Concerned Women for America is a conservative nonprofit “built on prayer
and action.” See generally, https://concernedwomen.org/about/ (“We believe
marriage is between one man and one woman, that sexual activity outside of that
marriage is sin, and that God created the human race male and female.”).
198
Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152.
199
Id. at 6-7.
200
Id. at 9.
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bathroom policies could possibly lead to an increase in bathroom
sexual assault, and instead relied on the reader’s inference.
William J. Bennett’s brief better articulated the fear-mongering
offered in the Concerned Women brief and at least granted the
concession that it is not transgender individuals themselves who pose a
safety concern, but non-transgender sexual predators who would take
advantage of the opportunity to enter a bathroom of the opposite
sex.201 Bennett argued transgender bathroom policies could be
“exploited by non-transgender sexual predators who falsely assert”
that they are transgender.202 Bennett then cited six occasions in which
transgender bathroom policies were allegedly exploited by sexual
deviants, including one where a man ran into the women’s locker
room and stripped naked, screaming that he was allowed to be there in
light of the new rule.203 To magnify the horror of the handful of
instances cited, Bennett points out that studies show two-thirds of
sexual assault instances go unreported, bringing the speculative total to
a mere eighteen.204 Yet, like the Concerned Women’s brief, Bennett’s
brief did not point to any statistics, studies, or data that demonstrate
that pro-transgender bathroom policies would have any effect on the
number of sexual assaults in restrooms.
B. The Flawed Reasoning in the “Animus” Briefs
Each of the three primary arguments raised in the several
“animus” briefs are fundamentally flawed. First, the plain language of
Title IX referring to biological sex has no bearing on whether the
school district relied on sex stereotyping in forcing Ash to use the
restroom that his sex stereotypically uses. Second, gender dysphoria is
not a mental illness, and even if it is, it certainly does not amount to a
201

Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152.
Id.
203
Id. at 21; see also Bult, Laura, Seattle Man Undresses in Women’s Locker
Room at Local Pool To Test New Transgender Bathroom Rule, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 17, 2016) http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/wa-man-womenbathroom-test-transgender-ruling-article-1.2535150.
204
Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152.
202
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disability because it does not impair any major life activity and it is
explicitly excluded from federal disability legislation. Third, there is
no evidence of transgender bathroom policies causing an increase in
instances of sexual assault.
i.

The “plain meaning” argument does not rebut the
Seventh Circuit ruling

Even if one accepts at face value the notion that Title IX and
Title VII apply only to sex-based discrimination, the sex-stereotyping
cause of action recognized in Price Waterhouse nonetheless
accommodates transgender discrimination claims. As the Seventh
Circuit properly noted in Whitaker, the school district attempted to
force Ash to use the restroom in accordance with the stereotype
expected of his birth sex.205 Moreover, the school district explicitly
used the word “sex” in its unwritten policy, which demonstrated that
the policy was clearly sex-based.206
Furthermore, arguing that the policy treats males and females
equally is no more persuasive than the arguments for antimiscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, where Virginia argued
that the law punished whites and blacks equally for interracial
marriage.207 The Loving court outright rejected that argument.208
Likewise, the argument that is grounded in the idea that the bathroom
policy punishes males and females equally for using the opposite
bathroom should be rejected as a futile attempt to discriminate on the
basis of gender identity.
Finally, although Citizens United argues that calling Ash “he”
is to “sacrifice the plain meaning of the English Language at the altar
of political correctness,”209 referring Ash as “he” is wholly within the
confines of the plain meaning of English. Ash presents himself as a
205

Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048.
Id.
207
388 U.S. 1 (1967)
208
Id.
209
Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.
206
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man, dresses like a man, calls himself a man, and styles his hair like a
man.210 Accordingly, he is a man, and calling him “he” is no sacrifice
to anyone, let alone some grandiose hypothetical “altar of political
correctness.”211
ii.

Gender dysphoria is not a mental illness and is not a
disability under the law

Because gender roles are no more than social constructs,212 the
refusal to conform to gender roles cannot logically be a mental illness.
In fact, according to the American Psychiatric Association, “gender
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder.”213 Therefore, gender
dysphoria is not a mental disorder.
However, even if one assumes that gender nonconformity is a
mental illness, it certainly does not fit the legal requirements of a
disability. A disability, generally, is a physical or mental impairment
that limits one or more life activities.214 Nothing about transitioning
genders impairs anything about a transgender person’s life. If
anything, it frees them from the constraints of society’s arbitrary
stereotypes and expectations of their birth sex. The only impairment to
a transgender person’s life from gender dysphoria is societal
harassment, like that exhibited in the “animus” briefs. Therefore,
because transgender people are not disabled, the argument that Ash
should file under the IDEA also fails.

210

Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1038.
Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.
212
See generally, Section II.
213
DSM-5: Gender Dysphoria, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 2013
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017)
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM
-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf.
214
42 U.S.C §12102(1)(a).
211
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Pro-Transgender Bathroom Policies Are Not a Safety
Threat.

The argument that transgender bathroom policies are likely to
increase bathroom sexual assault is unconvincing because there is no
evidence demonstrating the speculative fear whatsoever. The handful
of anecdotes the various briefs cite are no more than anecdotes and do
nothing to show a trend or correlation, much less causation. This fearbased argument should fail immediately with such a vacancy of
evidence.
Finally, to answer the Citizen United question, “what is to stop
the varsity boys’ lacrosse team from deciding en masse that they are
all girls, and barging into the girls’ locker room while the cheerleading
squad is changing clothes?”215 Simply put, the answer would be “a
note from a doctor diagnosing gender dysphoria,” which is what Ash
Whitaker immediately provided his school upon beginning his
transition.216 But Citizens United appears too wrapped up in animus to
parse legal issues in this submission to the highest court in the United
States. The Seventh Circuit addressed this disingenuous argument in
Whitaker, which Citizens United must have missed: “[t]his is not a
case where a student has merely announced that he is a different
gender. Rather, Ash has a medically diagnosed and documented
condition. Since his diagnosis, he has consistently lived in accordance
with his gender identity.”217 For the Citizens United brief to simply
toss Ash in with the hypothetical sexually predatory athletes “barging”
in on unsuspecting and vulnerable cheerleaders is a gross
mischaracterization of Ash’s simple request to go the bathroom with
the other boys.

215

Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1053.
217
Id.
216
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CONCLUSION
The legal groundwork upon which the Seventh Circuit came to
its decision in Whitaker is unassailable. In order to come to another
conclusion, a court deciding these issues must deviate from that firm
reasoning. As such, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis should serve as a
guiding light to other courts presiding over transgender bathroom
rights litigation. Regardless of the current political atmosphere, or of
the ongoing animus against transgender individuals displayed in the
“animus” briefs, the judicial branch must stand undeterred. The
executive branch and the legislative branch may test the judiciary’s
protections of transgender rights with statutes, regulatory
interpretations, and executive orders, but the analysis should remain
the same: forcing individuals to use certain bathrooms that violate
their gender identity is no different than sex stereotyping in any other
context. The Supreme Court of the United States should find the same.
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